For most Bissau-Guineans, the recent “coup” is neither surprising nor novel. Since independence in 1974, the country’s political trajectory has been shaped by recurrent military intervention.
On 26 November, army officers in Guinea-Bissau announced they had assumed “total control” of the country. They suspended the electoral process just as presidential results were expected, closed all borders, and imposed a nationwide curfew. The takeover led to the deposing and arrest, followed by the rapid release and flight, of President Umaro Sissoco Embaló. Soon after, the military installed senior military general Horta Inta-A Na Man as interim (transitional) President and appointed Ilídio Vieira Té, Embaló’s former finance minister, as Prime Minister.
But the speed and choreography of events have triggered accusations that the episode was a staged coup designed to reconfigure power without truly removing the political network surrounding the deposed president. Opposition leaders in Guinea-Bissau have publicly questioned the credibility of the takeover, noting that those elevated by the military were figures closely aligned with Embaló. Some foreign governments have echoed this scepticism; Senegal’s prime minister, for instance, described the takeover as a “sham coup,” suggesting it may have been engineered to pre-empt an unfavourable election outcome rather than to restore order.
These allegations add yet another layer of uncertainty to a country long shaped by political intrigue, military interventions, and fragile civilian rule. Once again, the country finds itself navigating the familiar trajectory of institutional uncertainty and economic disruption.
The African Union (AU) has also suspended Guinea-Bissau from all its activities following this week’s coup in the West African nation. The AU says the suspension will remain in force until constitutional order is fully restored.
For most Bissau-Guineans, the development is neither surprising nor novel. Since independence in 1974, the country’s political trajectory has been shaped by recurrent military intervention. The precedent was set in 1980 when João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira ousted President Luís Cabral, altering the foundational balance between civilian authority and military influence. From that point onward, the armed forces were effectively positioned as a decisive political arbiter, assuming roles that extended far beyond constitutional or professional mandates.
Subsequent decades reinforced this dynamic. The 1998–1999 armed confrontation, triggered by the dismissal of a senior military figure, escalated into a nationwide conflict that decimated administrative capacity and disrupted an already fragile state apparatus. Attempts to re-establish electoral governance were persistently undermined by political assassinations, abortive coup plans, and, most significantly, the 2012 military takeover that halted a potential democratic consolidation. Each episode lowered the threshold for military intervention, eroding institutional resilience and normalising abrupt political disruption.
The developmental implications of this chronic instability are substantial. Guinea-Bissau’s narrow economic base — dominated by cashew exports — makes the country highly susceptible to external shocks. Political volatility amplifies these structural vulnerabilities: long-term planning becomes impracticable, budgetary processes stall, and donors adopt a posture of caution or disengagement. As a result, gains in governance or socio-economic indicators tend to be intermittent and easily reversed, leaving the country without sustained momentum in development.
Additionally, instability has facilitated the entrenchment of illicit transnational networks. Over the last two decades, Guinea-Bissau has emerged as a transit point for cocaine trafficking between Latin America and Europe. This evolution is closely linked to weak oversight institutions, contested authority within security structures, and an environment in which political volatility undermines enforcement. The penetration of illicit economies distorts governance, empowering actors whose incentives run counter to state-building and reform, and further embedding the cycle of fragility.
Guinea-Bissau’s problem is not the episodic coup – whether real or staged; it is the entrenched political-military configuration that repeatedly produces them. Unless that configuration is fundamentally altered, the country will remain locked in a repetitive cycle of disruption, with each crisis reinforcing the conditions for the next.